India’s ongoing shortfall in fighter jet squadrons—an urgent defence crisis—can be traced to a decade of missed opportunities, flawed decision-making, and persistent systemic issues, primarily during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government from 2004 to 2014. At present, the Indian Air Force (IAF) maintains only about 29–31 active squadrons, starkly below the sanctioned 42, creating significant vulnerabilities against both China and Pakistan, whose air forces have modernised aggressively in recent years.
Bureaucratic Paralysis And Policy Failures (2004–2014)
The root of India’s current predicament lies in a period marked by bureaucratic inertia, political indecision, and financial constraints. During the UPA’s decade in power, the IAF was able to induct only 122 fighters—including 82 Su-30MKI jets—while regional adversaries, especially China, inducted more new fighters each year than India did over the entire decade.
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This lack of modernisation was exacerbated by institutional hesitancy and an overriding fear of corruption charges, which led to excessive caution and stalled procurement. For example, in 2014, India’s defence minister admitted publicly that the government lacked the funds to proceed with critical fighter jet purchases, a confession that signalled deep vulnerability at the strategic level.
The Disastrous MMRCA Deal And Its Fallout
At the heart of the IAF’s decline was the failed Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal. Launched in 2007, it aimed to acquire 126 modern fighters, but spiralled into a seven-year saga characterised by shifting goalposts, contentious negotiations, and deep mistrust.
The Rafale was selected as the winner in 2012 after a rigorous evaluation, but talks stalled on issues of price, technology transfer, and concerns about corruption. The deal ultimately collapsed; instead of 126 jets, India was forced to make an emergency purchase of just 36 Rafales in fly-away condition. The truncated Rafale buy left the fleet modernised only at the margins and did little to reverse the erosion of squadron strength.
TEJAS Program: Indigenous Ambitions, Delays, And Missed Targets
India’s efforts at developing an indigenous replacement, the TEJAS, further compounded the crisis. The program, originally launched in the 1980s to replace ageing MiG-21s, has suffered chronic delays, cost overruns, and technical bottlenecks, many stemming from shifting requirements and inadequate project management.
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As of 2025, delivery deadlines for the improved TEJAS MK-1A variant have slipped repeatedly, hampered by late engine shipments from GE Aerospace and evolving Air Force specifications that forced continual redesigns. Despite achieving operational clearance for TEJAS Mk-1, the inability to ramp up timely production left a gap that indigenous development alone could not fill.
Imports: Heavy Spending, Minimal Self-Reliance
While India has continued to rely on major imports, especially from Russia, these deals have not translated into robust domestic capability. Even at the peak of imports—nearly $4 billion annually in 2013–2014—weak offset clauses and suboptimal technology transfer agreements resulted in little meaningful enhancement to local aerospace expertise. The Su-30MKI, the mainstay of the IAF, still remains dependent on Russian components and support, despite attempts at local assembly. Efforts to localise or co-produce advanced jets—such as the recent offers for the Su-57E fifth-generation fighter—have only recently begun to align with India’s “self-reliance” aspirations, but production and induction remain years away.
Stagnant Squadron Strength And Modernisation Gap
Fighter Shortfall: As of 2025, India’s fighter squadron strength has dropped to 29–31, well below the sanctioned minimum of 42 needed for credible two-front deterrence. This is roughly on par with Pakistan’s 25 squadrons, while China is far ahead with 66 squadrons.
Ageing Fleet: Too many of India’s fighters are legacy aircraft (MiG-21s, Jaguars, Mirages) overdue for retirement, creating critical gaps in air combat capability.
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The “Lost Decade” And UPA Legacy
Procurement Policy Paralysis: The UPA government’s decade (2004–2014) saw significant delays and missed decisions in major procurements, notably the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender.
MMRCA Fiasco: Launched in mid-2000s to procure 126 modern fighters, the MMRCA deal collapsed after Rafale’s selection due to failed negotiations over cost, production responsibilities, quality guarantees, and technology transfer between Dassault (Rafale’s maker) and Indian state-run HAL.
HAL could not provide the required guarantees on manufacturing quality, and costs threatened to escalate, creating a deadlock that politics could not resolve. In 2013, last-minute governmental interventions abruptly halted final negotiations.
Result: Only 36 Rafales were imported directly from France years later, rather than the 126 originally intended, leaving a massive shortfall.
Not “Nil Procurement,” But Priorities Lopsided: While the UPA did sign some major arms deals and invested around $30 billion in diverse equipment from abroad (including Sukhoi-30MKIs), the focus largely bypassed fighter fleet modernisation in favour of other platforms.
Domestic Development Hurdles
HAL TEJAS Delays: India’s indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) TEJAS program was plagued by engine supply disruptions, lack of private sector partnerships, and slow decision-making. First flight took place decades after project start. Recent years saw further delays due to global engine supply issues, pushing induction timelines over a year past schedule.
The production agencies failed to consistently ramp up output; even as late as mid-2025, only a trickle of TEJAS Mk1A jets have been delivered to the Air Force. Inadequate domestic design and engine manufacturing capability meant HAL could not step in to replace ageing Russian aircraft as fast as needed.
Offset And Transfer-of-Technology Shortcomings
Weak Offset Clauses: Many defence import contracts (especially with Russia) featured weak technology transfer and offset stipulations, limiting India’s ability to build and sustain its own next-generation aircraft.
Industrial Ecosystem Lagging: Efforts under the UPA to bring the private sector into defence manufacturing saw progress, but the base was too small to rapidly indigenise production at scale.
Consequences And Current Trajectory
Crisis Response: After the failed MMRCA deal, India rushed a direct Rafale government-to-government import but this was far short of what was needed to make up numbers or bring next-generation capabilities to the full air arm.
Ongoing Gaps: Even today, India’s Air Force faces an uphill battle—needing to induct at least 40 fighters per year just to stabilise squadron strength, which current domestic and foreign supplies cannot meet.
Strategic Risk: The result of this lost decade and subsequent slow pace is a persistent and growing gap in air power relative to both China and, increasingly, Pakistan.
The Way Forward
The legacy of this “lost decade” is evident in today’s urgent pushes for both indigenous and cooperative foreign procurement. India is undertaking emergency purchases, accelerating the indigenous TEJAS program, and negotiating new large-scale multi-role fighter acquisitions (MRFA). Yet, even under best-case scenarios, experts project that reaching the authorised 42 squadrons will remain elusive for at least another decade, with optimistic estimates setting the achievable target at 35–36 squadrons by 2035—if all current projects proceed without further delay.
India’s fighter squadron crisis is the product of a sustained period of missed decisions, failed policies, and administrative inertia, compounded by faltering indigenous development and under-leveraged imports. While new urgency and reforms are finally underway, the damage done by the lost decade continues to cast a long shadow over national security and air combat readiness.
IDN (With Inputs From Republic World)
Agency
