As the Indian Air Force (IAF) prepares to phase out its ageing MiG-21 fighters this month, the service faces a severe capability gap in its combat fleet. The retirement of these long-serving aircraft will reduce the IAF’s operational strength from 31 to 29 squadrons, far below the sanctioned 42 squadrons considered necessary to meet a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. By the end of the decade, other veteran fighters—the Jaguars, Mirage-2000s, and MiG-29s—will also exit service, leaving India heavily dependent on the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, the new TEJAS MK-1A, and two squadrons of Rafales.
While all three are advanced 4.5-generation platforms, they fall short of the stealth and sensor fusion benchmarks set by fifth-generation designs now proliferating in the arsenals of major powers. The indigenous Fifth-Generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is progressing, but its induction is not expected before 2035. This time lag has triggered an urgent debate in New Delhi on whether India should quickly induct foreign fifth-generation fighters as an interim capability.
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The choice for India narrows down to two global contenders: the American F-35 Lightning II and the Russian Su-57 Felon. Both aircraft bring unique advantages but also significant drawbacks. The F-35 stands as the world’s most widely deployed fifth-generation fighter, backed by the United States’ global interoperability networks.
It excels in sensor fusion, electronic warfare dominance, and joint-force integration. Operational experience in Syria and other theatres has demonstrated its battlefield value. However, the F-35 is priced at nearly $100 million per unit and comes with operational restrictions.
Indian officials and experts doubt Washington would sell New Delhi the same variant in use with US forces, raising concerns over degraded capabilities in an export model. Equally decisive is America’s reluctance to share sensitive technology, a restriction that would clash with India’s Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat ambitions.
The Russian Su-57 Felon has fewer buyers internationally but offers India potential co-production, technology transfer, and cost advantages. At an estimated $60–75 million per unit if produced in India, the Su-57 could become a more affordable option than the F-35. The aircraft emphasises manoeuvrability, super-cruise, and multi-role capability, making it particularly effective in long-range strikes and offensive operations.
However, the Su-57 program has faced production delays, limited fleet deployment even within Russia, and doubts about its stealth performance compared to Western designs. Still, given longstanding defence ties with Moscow and recent diplomatic outreach by Indian leaders to Russia, conditions appear favourable for potential cooperation. Russian willingness to share technology further enhances its attractiveness from New Delhi’s perspective.
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Amid this strategic dilemma, sections of India’s security establishment argue for increasing the number of Rafales already in service. Although costly at around $170 million per aircraft, the Rafale is a proven platform with superior avionics, a deep-penetration strike capability, and combat-proven performance.
Inducting additional Rafale squadrons can build economies of scale, leverage existing training and maintenance infrastructure, and enhance uniformity in the IAF’s diverse fleet.
The challenge, however, lies in France’s rigid control over the aircraft’s source codes, including critical systems like the Thales AESA radar and mission computers. This limits India’s freedom to integrate indigenous weapons and upgrade systems independently, reinforcing dependence on Dassault. Nonetheless, the Rafale’s strengths during the recent Operation Sindoor underscore its continued relevance.
A larger obstacle facing the IAF is the lack of seamless sensor fusion across its heterogeneous fleet. Modern air warfare relies on secure, real-time data links connecting fighters, ground stations, airborne warning systems, and satellites to establish a unified situational picture and create “kill chains”.
During Operation Sindoor against Pakistan, the absence of such advanced integration across platforms, particularly between Rafale and Su-30MKI squadrons, revealed critical vulnerabilities. Without standardised data link protocols, platforms cannot exploit their maximum combat potential.
Though attempts have been made to integrate Indian weapons like Astra air-to-air missiles onto Rafales, restrictions on deeper software access remain a handicap. Experts argue any future acquisitions—whether Rafale, Su-57, or F-35—must include commitments to address these integration gaps.
Within the IAF and policymaking circles, there is recognition that simply adding fifth-generation platforms without weapons, network integration, and detection countermeasures would be inadequate. Current indigenous missiles and precision weapons do not fit into the internal bays of F-35s or Su-57s, raising the parallel requirement of acquiring compatible munitions alongside new aircraft.
There is also growing emphasis on building layered air defence ecosystems—enhanced surface-to-air missile systems, very high frequency (VHF) radars to track stealth aircraft, electronic warfare suites, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and hypersonic strike systems such as the BrahMos-2. Analysts argue these complementary areas will be essential to shape India’s aerial deterrence while bridging aircraft shortfalls.
Despite these parallel priorities, one fact remains inescapable: India’s regional rivals are accelerating stealth acquisitions. China has deployed both the J-20 and the J-35, while Pakistan is expected to join the fifth-generation arena with either a Chinese or Turkish stealth fighter in the near future. This evolving neighbourhood balance places India at a relative disadvantage unless immediate steps are taken.
A consensus is emerging that India potentially requires a twin approach—larger numbers of 4.5-generation Rafales for near-term needs, coupled with a limited induction of fifth-generation fighters like the Su-57 through co-production, until the AMCA is ready by the mid-2030s.
The decision before New Delhi, therefore, is not simply a competition of aircraft specifications or prices. It is a strategic choice shaped by geopolitics, industrial self-reliance, technological access, and long-term force structuring.
The IAF must modernise quickly, but it must do so in a way that balances affordability, standardisation, and future readiness. The fifth-generation choice—between the expensive but operationally validated F-35, the cost-effective but nascent Su-57, and the reliable Rafale expansion—will define India’s air power equation for the next two decades. India, pressed by time and geopolitics, has no luxury of delay.
IDN (With Agency Inputs)
