India’s pursuit of hypersonic weapons technology represents a fundamental shift in South Asian strategic dynamics, one that compresses decision-making time and potentially destabilises long-standing nuclear deterrence calculations, wrote Zohaib Altaf of the Diplomat.
The reported testing of India’s most advanced hypersonic cruise missile under the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s classified Project Vishnu on July 16, 2025, marks a critical inflection point in regional security.
While India has not officially confirmed the test, and some reports later denied it occurred, there is no doubt that India is moving toward development and testing of such capabilities under Project Vishnu.
The missile reportedly achieved Mach 8 speeds (approximately 11,000 km/h), demonstrated low-altitude manoeuvrability, and struck its target with precision. Designed for deployment from land, sea, and air platforms, the system is dual-capable, able to carry conventional or nuclear payloads.
This development places India among an elite group of nations possessing operational hypersonic capabilities alongside the United States, China, and Russia.
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India’s hypersonic trajectory began systematically with the Shaurya missile, tested in 2008 and 2020, which reached Mach 7.5 and laid early groundwork for manoeuvrable strike systems. The HSTDV followed in 2020, reaching Mach 5.9 at 30 km altitude.
The upcoming BrahMos-II, developed with Russia, is expected to achieve Mach 8 over 1,000-1,500 km range, with flight trials anticipated by 2027. India is also developing hypersonic drones like the RHH-150, reportedly capable of Mach 10 and mid-flight directional agility.
Project Vishnu encompasses an ambitious program to develop 12 distinct hypersonic systems for both offensive and defensive roles. The Extended Trajectory-Long Duration Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM) represents the flagship system, designed to achieve speeds between Mach 8 and Mach 10 with a range of 1,500 km, extendable to 2,500 km in surface-to-surface configuration.
Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma And Response Options
Pakistan faces a complex strategic dilemma in responding to India’s hypersonic capabilities. Pakistan’s geographic proximity to India compresses available time for detection, target discrimination, and interception. Even with potential acquisitions like the Chinese HQ-19 missile defence system, Pakistan’s capacity to neutralize fast, low-flying missiles across an extended border remains severely constrained.
The HQ-19 system, often compared to the U.S. THAAD system, is designed to intercept medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their mid-course and terminal phases. With interception altitudes between 70-150 kilometres and engagement ranges reportedly exceeding 1,000 kilometres, the HQ-19 offers Pakistan significant expansion of its strategic air defence envelope. Pakistan has reportedly entered advanced negotiations with China for the system’s acquisition.
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Pakistan faces two primary response options, both carrying significant risks. The first is pre-emptive strike capability. India’s deputy army chief revealed that during Director General of Military Operations-level talks, Pakistan warned India to “pull back” a launch vector, indicating Pakistan’s real-time intelligence and vector tracking capabilities. Once Pakistan inducts stealth platforms like the J-35, it may be tempted to launch pre-emptive strikes targeting Indian aircraft or missile launchers.
The second option involves exercising restraint and refraining from pre-emptive strikes even in the face of credible signs of an impending Indian attack. However, this path carries serious risks of conventional deterrence erosion. India’s hypersonic capabilities, paired with drones and precision-guided munitions, could severely degrade Pakistan’s conventional response capability by targeting runways, radar networks, and air defence systems in conflict opening phases.
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has evolved from “credible minimum deterrence” to “full spectrum deterrence,” incorporating tactical nuclear weapons like the Nasr missile system. This doctrine aims to deter India’s Cold Start strategy by threatening nuclear escalation at the tactical level. However, the compressed timeline imposed by hypersonic weapons may force Pakistan toward a “use-it-or-lose-it” mindset, increasing the likelihood of early nuclear use.
Crisis Communication Mechanisms Under Strain
The existing crisis communication infrastructure between India and Pakistan appears inadequate for managing hypersonic-era conflicts. The primary communication channel remains the single operational hotline between the Directors General of Military Operations, established after the 1971 war. This hotline proved crucial during the May 2025 crisis when Pakistan’s DGMO initiated contact with his Indian counterpart at 15:35 hours on May 10, leading to a ceasefire by 17:00 hours the same day.
However, the limitations of this system became apparent during the crisis. Pakistan’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs observed that there is only a single operational hotline between India and Pakistan, with no supporting missile pre-notification regime or formal crisis control frameworks. The absence of robust crisis communication mechanisms creates dangerous ambiguity, particularly when paired with the speed and opacity of hypersonic weapons.
The May 2025 crisis also highlighted the problematic role of external mediation. While the United States eventually played a backchannel role in securing the ceasefire, its involvement became politically toxic in India.
Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi accused the government of “surrendering to the U.S.,” prompting official denials of foreign mediation. This domestic political cost may deter Indian leaders from accepting U.S. involvement in future crises, weakening what has been described as the last remaining circuit breaker in South Asia’s escalation ladder.
Doctrinal Evolution And Strategic Implications
India’s hypersonic development reflects a broader doctrinal evolution toward precision strikes at blistering speed as central to response options under time-constrained escalation scenarios. This operational logic mirrors Israel’s recent campaign against Iran, where coordinated air, missile, and drone strikes systematically neutralized Iran’s air defence networks before conducting penetrating strikes. Israel’s experience in 1973, where it lost over 100 aircraft largely to surface-to-air missiles, shaped a doctrine of pre-emptive suppression that Indian defence officials appear to be embracing.
The dual-capable nature of India’s hypersonic systems creates dangerous ambiguity. Most hypersonic missiles can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, but their operational role remains undefined in India’s public doctrine. This lack of transparency creates uncertainty where Pakistan would have no reliable way to discern whether an incoming hypersonic strike intends to disable conventional forces or deliver a strategic decapitation blow.
The compressed decision-making timeline imposed by hypersonic weapons fundamentally alters crisis dynamics. Unlike traditional ballistic missile trajectories that are predictable and provide warning time, hypersonic cruise missiles operate at lower altitudes with mid-flight manoeuvrability, drastically reducing adversary reaction time and challenging current missile defence frameworks. This compression may outpace political deliberation, despite India’s insistence on maintaining escalation control.
Arms Control And Risk Reduction Challenges
The absence of arms control mechanisms specifically addressing hypersonic weapons exacerbates regional instability risks. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), while including hypersonic systems within its scope, focuses primarily on export controls rather than deployment limitations. India’s membership in the MTCR since 2016 allows for enhanced cooperation in missile technology development but does not constrain domestic hypersonic programs.
Existing confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan appear inadequate for the hypersonic era. The 1988 Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities remains the most consistently implemented confidence-building measure, with both countries exchanging nuclear facility coordinates annually for over three decades. However, this agreement predates hypersonic weapons and does not address the ambiguity these systems create.
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, successfully employed by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, have been proposed for India and Pakistan but remain unimplemented. Such Center could provide structured engagement mechanisms and institutional contacts essential for managing hypersonic-era crises.
Strategic Stability Implications
The introduction of hypersonic weapons into South Asian security dynamics represents more than technological advancement; it fundamentally alters the regional strategic balance. The combination of extreme speed, manoeuvrability, and dual-capability creates what experts term “warhead ambiguity,” where adversaries cannot reliably determine whether incoming strikes carry conventional or nuclear payloads.
This ambiguity is particularly destabilizing in the India-Pakistan context, where geographic proximity already compresses reaction times. Pakistan’s full spectrum deterrence doctrine, designed to counter India’s conventional superiority, may become increasingly unstable as hypersonic weapons erode conventional deterrence effectiveness. The risk of “use-it-or-lose-it” calculations increases when command and control systems face potential degradation from precision hypersonic strikes.
The escalation ladder framework, traditionally used to understand crisis dynamics, requires fundamental revision for the hypersonic era. Recent analysis of the May 2025 conflict suggests that future India-Pakistan crises will begin at higher baselines, with stand-off missile and drone attacks normalized as initial moves. Time available for crisis management will likely shrink, with escalation moving swiftly from precision strikes to high-value target attacks.
Conclusion: The Dangerous Acceleration of Strategic Competition
India’s hypersonic arms development represents a paradigmatic shift in South Asian security dynamics, one that accelerates conflict timelines while degrading existing crisis management mechanisms. The combination of blistering speed, precision targeting, and dual-capability creates a strategically unstable environment where traditional deterrence calculations may no longer apply.
The May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict provided a preview of how future confrontations may unfold in the hypersonic era. This evolution toward pre-emptive targeting of military assets, when combined with hypersonic delivery systems, creates powerful incentives for adversaries to consider pre-emptive action.
Pakistan’s response options remain limited and risky. While systems like the Chinese HQ-19 may provide some defensive capability, the fundamental challenge of defending against manoeuvrable hypersonic weapons across extended borders persists. The compression of decision-making time may force Pakistan toward earlier nuclear escalation, particularly given its full spectrum deterrence doctrine.
The existing crisis communication infrastructure, centred on a single DGMO hotline established after the 1971 war, appears inadequate for managing hypersonic-era conflicts. The absence of robust missile pre-notification regimes, Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, or formal crisis control frameworks creates dangerous ambiguity precisely when clarity becomes most crucial.
Without comprehensive arms control mechanisms, missile restraint regimes, or institutionalized pathways to reduce tensions, South Asia risks entering a period where strategic speed becomes a double-edged sword. While hypersonic weapons may provide tactical advantages, they also compress the space for political deliberation and diplomatic intervention that has historically prevented nuclear escalation.
The international community’s limited involvement in South Asian crisis management, complicated by domestic political costs in both India and Pakistan, further reduces available circuit breakers. As the region moves toward deployment of operational hypersonic systems over the next decade, the window for establishing appropriate guardrails and communication mechanisms continues to narrow.
The ultimate irony of hypersonic weapons in South Asia may be that systems designed to enhance security through superior strike capabilities instead create conditions where no side can confidently predict outcomes—only costs. In a region without adequate escalation buffers, strategic speed may prove less an advantage than a pathway to inadvertent conflict escalation that neither side intended nor can control.
Based On A Report In The Diplomat
Agencies
